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Abstract
Complying wi th  the  development  needs  of  the 
globalization era, Nancy Fraser’s theory of justice 
criticizes and reconstructs Western theorists’ theory of 
justice, as represented by John Rawls and Axel Honneth, 
post-1990s. To understand the connotation and value 
orientation of such theory correctly, this paper analyzed 
and evaluated its contributions and limitations through 
critical reflection on the dimensions and normative 
foundations determined by such theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Nancy Fraser is a famous contemporary American political 
philosopher, who restructures the theory of justice by 
criticizing the justice system of Western society represented 
by the U.S. as well as criticizing the theory of recognition 
of theorists represented by Axel Honneth and Charles 
Taylor. Her theory has attracted broad attention from many 
Western left theorists for its distinct characteristics.
While criticizing the justice system and correlative 
theory of Western capitalist society since the 1990s, 
Nancy Fraser proposed the theory of justice that takes 
participation equality as its normative foundation and 
takes redistribution, recognition, and representation as 
its dimensions. She thinks that justice should first have 
the dimension of redistribution. In addition, she proposes 
that the theory of justice of such theorists as Karl Marx, 
John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin be summarized by way 
of analytical distinction. For my purpose here, however, 
we need not commit ourselves to any one particular 
theoretical account. We need only subscribe to a rough 
and general understanding of socioeconomic injustice 
informed by a commitment to egalitarianism (Nancy, 
1997, p.14). Regarding the cultural dimension of justice, 
according to Fraser, the injustice of the cultural dimension 
mainly takes the form of “wrong recognition during 
social intercourse”, and the aim of “recognition is to free 
the individuals or groups from the subordinate status of 
social culture as well as endow all social members with 
equal cultural status and identity”. Regarding the political 
dimension of justice, according to Fraser, people’s appeal 
for redistribution and recognition goes beyond territorial 
states in the context of globalization. This concerns the 
nature of state power and decision rule. That is, justice 
should have the political dimension of representation. 
The principle of problem-solving procedures can only be 
provided for each dimension by establishing a relevant 
principle telling us who are qualified to participate in 
social life as members. The term of political representation 
can mean both symbolic framing and political voice 
(Nancy, 2008, p.146). Regarding the normative foundation 
of justice, Fraser proposed that the normative foundation 
of justice is participation equality. According to this norm, 
justice requires social arrangement that permit all (adult) 
members of society to interact with one another as peers 
(Nancy, 2003, p.36). The realization of participation 
equality requires equal distribution of material resources, 
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regardless of the participants’ differences in sex, race, and 
other features.
1.  REFLECTION ON THE DIMENSIONS 
OF NANCY FRASER’S THEORY OF 
JUSTICE
Fraser’s theory of justice criticizes and reconstructs the 
theory of justice of Western theorists represented by Rawls 
and Honneth post-1990s. The most distinct feature of such 
theory is as follows: complying with the change of era, 
it has enriched the value pursuit of the theory of justice, 
taken participation equality as its normative foundation, 
and expressed Fraser’s reflection on the value goal of 
the theory of justice and the exploration of its realization 
conditions and methods. The redistribution, recognition, 
and representation dimensions determined by such 
theory are integration and reconstruction of the theory 
of distributive justice, theory of recognition, and theory 
of global justice. In some sense, they have subverted 
people’s traditional understanding of and reflection on 
justice. The thought of this theory integrating construction 
logic and value has drawn attention from Western scholars 
for its scientific rationality and usefulness in theory and 
practice.
2 .   R E F L E C T I O N  O N  T H E 
REDISTRIBUTION DIMENSION OF 
JUSTICE
Although Fraser’s identification of redistribution as 
one of the dimensions of justice inherits contemporary 
Western justice theory, it endows this concept with new 
meanings, namely the theory of justice struggling on 
equitable distribution after Marx. However, this view 
has been challenged by scholars. In the article “Is Nancy 
Fraser’s Critique of Theories of Distributive Justice 
Justified”, Ingrid Robeyns points out that Fraser ignores 
the differences between different theories of distributive 
justice，it seems to be an oversimplified judgment of 
Rawls’ theory and it certainly does not hold for Amartya 
Sen’s the capability approach (Robeyns, 2003, p.538). 
Rawls’ theory of justice developed in the U.S. in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The political task of his age is advocating real 
equality as well as proving the necessity of the welfare 
state, rather than discussing how to design a just welfare 
state. But Robeyns agrees Fraser’s critique of the theory 
of Dworkin’s Equality of Resources, because in that he 
assumes that they are effectively protected by certain 
liberties and legal rights. This makes it very difficult to 
incorporate issues of recognition. He holds that as long 
as we are able to eliminate discrimination, preference-
deformation, and prejudice, cultural justice will be taken 
care of, so that we can then focus on economic justice 
(Ibid., p.542). Compared with Fraser’s theory, Robeyns 
think Sen’s the capability approach is promising as a 
broad theory of social justice that can encompass both the 
cultural and the economic (Ibid., p.551).
Should Fraser downplay the differences among the 
different theories of distributive justice? In fact, Rawls, 
Dworkin, and Sen’s theories of justice all have their own 
characteristics. Rawls’ theory of distributive justice can 
be summarized as institutional justice, while Dworkin 
wishes to realize justice through the equal distribution of 
resources. Sen’s the capability approach was initiated by 
searching for a better perspective on individual advantages 
than can be found in the Rawlsian focus on primary 
goods. He think any substantive theory of ethics and 
political philosophy, particularly any theory of justice, has 
to choose an informational focus, that is, it has to decide 
which features of the world we should concentrate on in 
judging a society and in assessing justice and injustice 
(Sen, 2009). Fraser indiscriminately regards the theory of 
the above-mentioned theorists as the theory of distributive 
justice and ignores the differences among their studies 
on the theory of distributive justice. In addition, Fraser 
summarizes the theories of the above-mentioned theorists 
by taking a one-sided approach through the concept of 
redistribution. The issue of redistribution is not all that is 
discussed by Rawls in The Law of Peoples and by Sen in 
The Idea of Justice. Therefore, by taking redistribution 
as one dimension of justice and ignoring the studies 
carried by theorists of justice, Fraser can hardly convince 
supporters of such theorists as Rawls, Dworkin, and Sen. 
Redistribution must be redefined to enable it to cover the 
main ideas of the above-mentioned theorists.
3.  REFLECTION ON THE RECOGNITION 
DIMENSION OF JUSTICE
The theory of recognition is one of the important origins 
of Fraser’s theory of justice. According to Fraser, the 
overall characteristic of justice in the era of “post-
socialism” is interruptus both distributive justice and 
the justice of recognition, and the current theories of 
justice fail to combine the two well. Thus, Fraser agrees 
with the basic viewpoint of the theory of recognition, 
and thinks the harm and insult caused by rejection of the 
appeal for recognition is the criterion judging whether 
the social system is fair or not. Under the background 
of the globalization of neo-liberalism, the problem of 
economic inequality is worsening, and the issue and 
problem of redistribution and recognition, respectively 
should be taken as the dimensions of the theory of justice. 
Nevertheless, Fraser considers recognition as one of the 
dimensions of justice while theorists, such as Honneth and 
Taylor, regard recognition as a normative foundation. In 
the article “Struggling over the Meaning of Recognition”, 
Nikolas Kompridis studies the controversy between 
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Honneth and Fraser about how to view the issue of 
recognition, and holds that the view taking recognition as 
an issue of justice and the view taking recognition as an 
issue of self-realization are both built on false arguments. 
Since the very meaning of recognition is itself contestable, 
not just in theory but in practice, it may be wiser to resist 
defining it too strictly in relation to this or that normative 
ideal (Kompridis, 2007). As the appeal for recognition 
is very uncertain, identification of the wrong recognition 
requires subject experience and discourse without subject. 
Fraser’s theory neglects subjective experience but stresses 
subjectless discourses that is prepared to privilege the 
latter at the expense of the former reveals a certain 
positivist residue in her thinking , as though we could give 
an account of misrecognition without need of a suffering 
subject (Ibid.).
The precondition under which both Honneth and 
Fraser identify it is that they both consider recognition 
as the tool for interpretation, solve the problems of 
recognition, identity, and justice through medical methods, 
and attempt to instrumentalize those that cannot be 
instrumentalized. As recognition cannot be redistributed, 
the concept of “recognition of deconstruction” put 
forward by Fraser needs unavoidably associate the issue 
of recognition with the issue of identity. However, it is the 
issue of identity that she wants to clearly distinguish from 
the issue of recognition. As a result, the logical error of 
a circular argument arises. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
system advocated by Fraser is different from traditional 
theories of justice, such as liberalism, equalitarianism, 
and communitarianism, and it is also different from the 
view highlighted by the theory of recognition, which 
states recognition plays a dominant role in the theory 
of justice. It is dedicated to integrating the two kinds of 
appeal, namely the appeal for recognition and the appeal 
for redistribution, into the theory of justice’s common 
dimensions. Its value orientation that struggles for the 
realization of the dual goals (namely, redistribution and 
recognition) reflects its creativity and era while deepening 
the understanding of justice.
4 .   R E F L E C T I O N  O N  T H E 
REPRESENTATION DIMENSION OF 
JUSTICE
Fraser takes representation as the independent dimension 
of the theory of justice, with a view to expand the 
application scope of the theory of justice as well as 
respond to the appeal in the globalization era for justice. 
According to her, the reason why justice should be 
reconstructed from a global perspective is that the 
Westphalian frame clearly defines the subject of justice. 
However, along with globalization, adjustment must be 
made to the Westphalian system so as to well respond to 
the appeal in the globalization era for justice. This means 
that the core problems concerning justice (including the 
nature of justice, subject of justice, and means of justice 
realization) have all changed and need to be redefined. 
The two main forms of pursuit of justice, namely 
redistribution and recognition, have both made one’s focus 
on justice change due to the collapse of this frame system. 
This is a new feature of the pursuit of justice in the 
globalization era, which means we should not only rethink 
about such problem from the epistemology aspect of “what 
is justice”, but also think at the ontological level of “what 
the theoretical framework of justice realization under 
the context of globalization is” and “how the subject of 
justice should be defined”. As Fraser said that not just the 
“what” but also the “Who” is up for grabs (Nancy, 2008, 
p.15). Fraser puts forward the concept of post-Westphalia, 
which provides theoretical support for thinking about 
the paradigm shift of global justice beyond national 
boundaries. She proposed that the subject of justice should 
be determined by following the principle of “all people 
restricted”, justice should take participation equality as 
the normative foundation; contain the dimensions of 
redistribution, recognition, and representation; and finish 
the reconstruction of the theory of justice.
Fraser constructs the theory of global justice by 
introducing the dimension of representation, which 
is different from the current various theories about 
global justice. Among them are the theory of global 
justice represented by Rawls’ The Law of Peoples; the 
constructive postmodern global justice theory represented 
by that of David Ray Griffin, which advocates the world’s 
religions, morality, and non-governmental organizations 
should be all mobilized to realize global justice; the theory 
of global justice represented by that of Thomas Pogge, 
which advocates the internal and external functions of 
government should be improved and global institutional 
rule reform should be promoted; the theory of global 
justice represented by that of Otfrid HÖffe, which 
advocates global justice regulations should be laid down 
and global national organizations should be established; 
and the pluralism global justice theory of deconstructive 
postmodernism represented by Deleuze, Lyotard, and 
Derrida, which advocates heterogeneous pluralism. 
Fraser uses the concept of representation to stress the 
viewpoint of the representation of common people rather 
than political elites, which provides new perspectives 
and research fields to solve the problems existing in 
current global justice systems. However, when the root 
cause of injustice is reviewed from a global perspective, 
though the existing international regimes have improved, 
the phenomenon that the superpowers intervene in 
international orders have not substantially changed. The 
global justice of representation proposed by Fraser does 
not really reveal the nature of global injustice and cannot 
shake the foundation of neo-liberalism. Therefore, the 
theory of global justice constructed by, to a certain extent, 
has the flavor of populism.
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5.  REFLECTION ON THE NORMATIVE 
FOUNDATION OF JUSTICE
Fraser proposes that participation equality should 
be taken as the normative foundation of her theory 
of justice. She thinks that justice requires social 
arrangements where all social members influence each 
other as equal subjects. This concept requires that the 
material resources must be so distributed as to ensure the 
independence and opinions of the participants as well as 
that institutionalized cultural value model should show 
equal respect for all the participants. But Rainer Forst 
does not identify with the theory of justice put forward 
by Fraser that takes participation equality as the basis 
and takes recognition, redistribution, and representation 
as the dimensions. He proposes solving problems of 
domination and unreasonable arbitrary rulings through a 
kind of justificatory monism and diagnostic-evaluative 
pluralism in the article “First Things First: Redistribution, 
Recognition and Justification” Such theory takes 
justification as the standard and “puts first things first” 
as the methodology of theoretical construction. The 
most fundamental principles of justice do not require 
specific forms of distributing certain goods; rather, they 
demand that every such distribution has to proceed in the 
most justifiable way (Forst, 2007, p.295). Forst suggest 
we distinguish conceptually between fundamental (Or 
minimal) and maximal justice. Fundamental justice call 
for the establishment of a basic structure of justification, 
i.e. one in which all members have sufficient status and 
power to decide about the institutions they are to live 
under. Maximal justice then means the establishment of a 
fully justified basic structure, i.e. of a basic structure that 
grants those rights, life chances and goods that citizens of 
a just society could not reciprocally deny each other (Ibid., 
296).
It can be seen from the analysis above that Fraser 
makes participation equality more applicable through 
practical methods, as the form of wrong recognition might 
deny the common humanity of participants or deny the 
uniqueness of participants. Practical methods are adopted 
due to the complexity of wrong recognition and in order 
to oppose the opinion put forward by some distribution 
theorists that justice should limit those abilities shared 
by all human beings. Adoption of practical methods can 
hinder recognition that can tell apart different people 
and is necessary to recognize common humanity in a 
general sense. The distinctive idea is put forward by 
recognition theorists that everyone always needs to be 
recognized cannot explain why only some of the social 
differences have given rise to the appeal for recognition, 
nor explain the appeal for recognition is made only in 
some aspects. Therefore, the theory of distribution and 
theory of recognition cannot cover all on this issue, 
points out that practical methods are adopted absolutely 
in view of the diversity and complexity of the forms of 
wrong recognition. This question cannot be answered or 
solved from the abstract philosophical viewpoint, but only 
through critical social theory. Nevertheless, it is unwise 
for Fraser  to take participation equality as the criterion 
proving the reasonableness of the pursuit of justice and the 
conceptual tool that analyzes the phenomenon of injustice, 
for the concept of equality has decisive significance and 
is not a more practical idea of participation. Injustice 
takes many forms, including economic exploitation 
(or exclusion) and lack of cultural recognition. It is 
unnecessary to confine languages of social analysis of 
these forms.
CONCLUSION
Through the introduction and analysis above, a 
comprehensive understanding can be gained of the 
characteristics and value orientation of Fraser’s theory 
of justice. Undoubtedly, her theory has made some 
contributions. On the other hand, the challenges from 
many theorists also indicate there is much to improve of 
such theory.
Theoretical contributions made by Fraser should 
be fully affirmed. Firstly, her theory truly reflects the 
diversity of the pursuit of justice and the theoretical 
predicament in contemporary Western capitalist countries 
against the background of globalization. Fraser discovers 
that neither the theory of distributive justice, nor the 
theory of recognition justice, nor even the theory of global 
justice can objectively interpret the pursuit of justice in 
the capitalist social system or provide valuable guidance 
for people in pursuit of justice. Her idea of theoretical 
construction that attempts to integrate the three justice 
theory systems provides a way of thinking for people to 
push aside confusion regarding justice as well as broaden 
the horizon for studies and the construction of the theory 
of justice. 
Secondly, Fraser has made an active and beneficial 
exploration for the realization of the goal of justice 
theory integration. To realize the goal of theoretical 
integration, the normative foundation must be laid for 
distributive justice, recognition justice, and global justice 
to belong to the same frame theory. For this purpose, 
Fraser proposes that participation equality should be 
taken as the normative foundation of her theory. The 
application of the concept of participation equality has 
created basic conditions that can help to construct norms 
for the realization of redistribution and recognition 
integration, and provide standards for identification of the 
properness of the pursuit of recognition and redistribution. 
Whether it is the issue of recognition or the issue of 
distribution, those in pursuit of justice must prove what 
they have encountered has prevented them from equally 
participating in social life. Though the concepts of 
redistribution, recognition, and representation are not new 
to us, Fraser’s singular contribution is to have constructed 
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a careful bifocal theory that can attend simultaneously 
to the recognition and distribution dimensions of social 
institutions, without inaccurately reducing either one to 
the other. Only such a theory can be sufficiently attentive 
to the interconnections, the interferences, the mutual 
reinforcements, and the negative and positive feedback 
loops that occur between economic and cultural forms of 
injustice (Zurn, 2003).
Thirdly, Fraser’s reconstruction of the justice theory 
paradigm is a positive and useful exploration for the 
conversion of the paradigm of the contemporary justice 
theory. Her discussion of social justice has shifted from 
a focus on external material elements for the subjects to 
enjoy equal status to a recognition of subjects and attention 
to self-realization, which not only reflects an ethical turn 
of contemporary political philosophy, but also the latest 
development direction of critical social theory. She has 
not only inherited the traditional critical social theory 
created by the Frankfurt School, but also dedicated herself 
to pursue material expression on life and its significance. 
She highlights the dimension of recognition, but does 
not allow recognition to be unrestricted. She stresses the 
importance of economic equality and representation, and 
wishes to restore the stable relationship among morality, 
law, and politics. This is in order to rebuild social order 
as well as realize the goal of equality, democracy, and 
justice.
The limitations of Fraser’s theory should be viewed 
objectively. First, the studies by Fraser do not discuss too 
much the criticism on the theory of distributive justice, 
which is the main reason why her theory seems more 
a kind of cultural criticism theory. Judith Butler in the 
article Merely Culture point out that the cultural focus 
of left politics has abandoned the materialist project of 
Marxism, that it fails to address questions of economic 
equity and redistribution, that it fails as well to situate 
culture in terms of a systematic understanding of social 
and economic modes of production; that the cultural focus 
of left politics has splintered the left into identitarian 
sects, that we have lost a set of common ideals and 
goals, a sense of a common history, a common set of 
values, a common language and even an objective and 
universal mode of rationality; that the cultural focus of 
left politics substitutes a self-centred and trival form of 
politics that focuses on transient events, practices, and 
objects rather than offering a more robust, serious and 
comprehensive vision of the systematic interrelatedness of 
social and economic conditions (Butler, 1997, p.34). This 
indicates that there are dissenters of the theory of justice 
constructed by Fraser, including left critical theorists, 
recognition theorists, and liberal justice theorists, though 
her theory has exerted great influence and reflected 
the newest research trend of the Western theory of 
justice, but as she confess that we are far from having 
convincing answers  (Nancy, 2008, p.157). Second, 
takes redistribution, recognition, and representation as 
the dimensions of justice and believes they enjoy equal 
status, which is inconsistent with the decisive role of the 
economic basis highlighted by Marxism. Though the 
struggle for recognition has become the pursuit that cannot 
be ignored for the realization of justice, income inequality 
still remains the central issue of the 21st century. Although 
both critical theorists and recognition theorists realize 
the importance of the pursuit of recognition in the theory 
of justice, neither of them identifies that the economy 
is the root cause of social conflict. In this regard, Fraser 
has undoubtedly neglected the economic reason behind 
recognition and representation. Fraser’s theory of justice 
becomes less persuasive as it downplays the fundamental 
role of the dimension of the economy in the theory of 
justice. According to her, what follows economic injustice 
and cultural injustice is political injustice. As a result, 
some people are prevented from participating in social 
interactions with the same status as others; the interactive 
relationship among people fails to be studied under 
social material conditions; the factors that coordinate 
the relationship among people is summarized as some 
social structure and the decisive role of economic factors 
are neglected; and the economic field, cultural field, 
and political field are taken separately and unrelated. 
Therefore, her theory has some limitations. What is more, 
critical theorists keeping up with the times should never 
pay scant attention to forms of social injustice caused 
by legal systems and political structures. Insufficient 
studies in this field means that such theory needs further 
improvement.
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